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Digital twins offer a unique opportunity to design, test, deploy, monitor, and control real-world
robotic processes. In this paper we present a novel, modular digital twinning framework
developed for the investigation of safety within collaborative robotic manufacturing processes.
The modular architecture supports scalable representations of user-defined cyber-physical
environments, and tools for safety analysis and control. This versatile research tool facilitates
the creation ofmixed environments of DigitalModels, Digital Shadows, andDigital Twins, whilst
standardising communication and physical system representation across different hardware
platforms. The framework is demonstrated as applied to an industrial case-study focused on
the safety assurance of a collaborative robotic manufacturing process. We describe the
creation of a digital twin scenario, consisting of individual digital twins of entities in the
manufacturing case study, and the application of a synthesised safety controller from our
wider work. We show how the framework is able to provide adequate evidence to virtually
assess safety claims made against the safety controller using a supporting validation module
and testing strategy. The implementation, evidence and safety investigation is presented and
discussed, raising exciting possibilities for the use of digital twins in robotic safety assurance.
Keywords: collaborative robot safety, digital twins, modular framework, risk-informed software synthesis,
probabilistic model checking, automated code generation, human-robot collaboration, robotics
1 INTRODUCTION
Collaborative robots promise to transform the manufacturing sector, enabling humans and robots to
work together in shared spaces and physically interact to maximise the benefits of both manual and
robotic processes. As such the market for collaborative robots has seen rapid growth in recent years,
and is predicted to reach $5.6bn by 2027, accounting for 30% of the total robot market (Interact
analysis, 2019). However, in practice safety remains a critical issue and a barrier to truly collaborative
processes: international standards (ISO/TS 15066, 2016; ISO/TS 10218, 2011a; ISO/TS 10218, 2011b)
provide requirements for safe operation, but meeting these in complex settings is difficult and there is
little guidance on how to develop safe collaborative processes. In the United States, NIST have
identified key barriers to human robot collaboration including ensuring “safe human robot
interaction”, providing accurate “sensing and perception for unstructured environments”, and
providing realistic “modelling and simulation” (NIST, 2016).
Our work on the Confident Safety Integration for Collaborative Robotics (CSI:Cobot) project
















This article was submitted to
Robotic Control Systems,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Robotics and AI
Received: 13 August 2021
Accepted: 19 November 2021
Published: 10 December 2021
Citation:
Douthwaite JA, Lesage B,
Gleirscher M, Calinescu R, Aitken J,
Alexander R and Law J (2021) A
Modular Digital Twinning Framework
for Safety Assurance of
Collaborative Robotics.
Front. Robot. AI 8:758099.
doi: 10.3389/frobt.2021.758099
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org December 2021 | Volume 8 | Article 7580991
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 10 December 2021
doi: 10.3389/frobt.2021.758099
assurance for industrial collaborative robotics1. Due to Covid-19
restrictions limiting access to physical facilities in recent times, we
have adopted the novel approach of using digital twins (DTs) to
support our research. Specifically, we have developed a modular,
general-purpose DT framework (shown in Figure 1) which
enables on-line and off-line development, testing, deployment,
and validation of safety tools. This has opened exciting new
possibilities for robotics safety research, and is underpinning our
activities into safety sensing and decision making, safety testing,
controller synthesis, cyber security, and safety visualisation
(Wang et al., 2021; Gleirscher and Calinescu, 2021; Lesage and
Alexander, 2020; Gleirscher et al., 2021; Lesage and Alexander,
2021).
Digital twins present an opportunity to gain unprecedented
access to a manufacturing process and its data in order to
interrogate, monitor and control physical assets and processes
in real-time and throughout their life cycle. They have been cited
as a key enabling technology for Industry 4.0, enhancing the
information available to process engineers, safety engineers and
management and supporting the rapid design, simulation,
testing, verification, deployment of future systems (Bolton
et al., 2018; Agnusdei et al., 2021b). In particular they allow
critical “what if?” and “why?” questions to be answered within the
design cycle, and the exploration of system choices and their
impact on operability and deployment.
We have developed a modular DT framework that takes
advantage of the above properties, and allows us to combine
simulated and real-world data to assess the safety of collaborative
robotic processes both during the design phase and during
operation. The modular nature of the framework has been
crucial to the development of DTs that represent multiple
physical systems with variable capabilities, limitations, and
complex relationships with external hardware. Modularisation
allows this complexity to be managed systemically and invoked to
create sophisticated, realistic case-study scenarios. Specialist tools
developed within the framework allow investigation of topics
including risk and mitigation strategies, which can be rapidly
redeployed (or extended) in response to changes in
configurations or conditions as processes are developed.
Furthermore, the nature of digital twins enables safety
techniques developed in the digital domain to be deployed in
the physical domain using the same environment.
In the remainder of this article we present ourmodular framework
and demonstrate its application to the safety assurance of a
collaborative robot spot-welding process. We begin in Section 2
by introducing the concept of a safety-critical digital twin, followed by
a review of related work in Section 3 and the case for a newmodular
approach to support safety assurance. In Section 4 we describe our
framework, and themodular representation used in detail. In Section
5 we demonstrate its use in assuring the safety of an industrial case
study focusing on two modules: 1) an experimental safety controller,
and 2) an evaluationmodule used validate that controller. The results
of the case-study are presented and discussed in Section 6 with
conclusions and future development discussed in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 What Is a Digital Twin?
In the growing body of literature, the term Digital Twin (DT) has
been used inconsistently to define different relationships between
the physical and digital components. In Kritzinger et al. (2018),
an in-depth review is categorising concepts associated with DTs is
provided. Concepts such as the Digital Shadow (DS) and Digital
Model (DM), differ with respect to the communication
infrastructure between the physical and digital components;
which is typically unilateral or not considered, respectively. A
clear definition of a DT can, however, be found in Grieves and
Vickers (2016) as:
“a digital informational construct about a physical
system . . . created as an entity on its own. This
digital information would be a “twin” of the
information that was embedded within the physical
system itself and be linked with that physical system
through the entire lifecycle of the system.” (Grieves and
Vickers, 2016)
A DT could then be said to take the level of integration further,
in that information regarding the state of the physical and digital
components can be interrogated simultaneously and compared.
The user is presented with a single interface to the cyber-physical
system (CPS) that persists throughout its operational life time
(Kritzinger et al., 2018; Qi et al., 2018).
2.2 Why Digital Twins?
DTs represent a fundamental change in the relationship between
conventional simulation approaches and the associated hardware.
FIGURE 1 | An isometric view of the CSI framework environment applied
to a collaborative welding cell case-study. Based in Unity
®
3D, digital twins of
an operator, collaborative robot manipulator, safety scanner and light-barrier
are shown.
1https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/sheffieldrobotics/about/csi-cobots/csi-project
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At its core, these differences can be broken down into three key
areas:
1. Persistence—ADT is virtual record of a physical system’s life-
cycle. Information on the individual system’s (i.e., usage or
deterioration) can captured regularly, modelled stored and
maintained across applications.
2. Insight—Similar to conventional simulation, DTs can be used
to predict what may happen on their system. DTs however
provide an interface to what is happening on the hardware
now and provide a means to interrogate the design.
3. Explainability—Traditionally, simulations cannot be used to
provide insight into the interactions of physical systems;
instead depending on accurate understanding of the possible
what-if? scenarios. DTs present a unique insight for
investigation into unexpected behaviours when they occur and
diagnose points of failure. This provides evidence to support
process safety, design and inform future simulations.
System statistics can be simultaneously extracted, compared
and analysed to better understand and respond to divergences
between simulation (expectations) and reality (feedback). This is
crucial in scenarios where real-time responses must be enacted to
avoid unsafe conditions as they develop.
Well established, versatile DTs present a number of
opportunities to enhance collaborative safety in manufacturing
environments, which can be classified into the following key
areas:
1. Validation—A DT can provide a virtual interface to a real-
world physical process as a means to validate and compare
actions across the component’s life-cycle. Scenarios that may
be expensive, time-consuming or too dangerous to reproduced
physically can represented with a DT and evaluated against
operational claims and constraints.
2. Analysis—High fidelity DTs interacting with a physical twin
(PT) in dangerous scenarios can provide additional sources of
structured data independently of the capabilities of the
standard PT. This source is extensible, customised and
structured and presents a hybrid view of the digital and
physical domains. Storage of such information presents a
unique opportunity for forensic analysis and diagnostics.
3. Prediction—A live DT is in a unique position to form
predictions ahead of the current PT state. Actions of the
PT can be previewed in light of defined safety constraints,
and its response to anomalies assessed, ahead of any physical
constraint violation. State-of-the-art models of the component
allow performance projections to be generated (for example
interference, degradation and damage).
4. Enhancement—The duality of the PT and DT provides a
scalable interface for expanding the base functionality of the
PT. Parallel modelling of the PT using a DT facilitates a better
understanding of anomalous behaviour; this may be the result
of a malicious action, component failure or procedure
violation. Using the additional feedback of a DT (and
additional DT sensors), proprietary systems can enact
executive decisions in a wider information space.
Until recently, DTs have been typically operated as closed
systems emphasising extended functionality of an individual
system or robot. As a result, the advantages of wider data
access in systems of multiple DTs have been largely neglected.
Modular frameworks that allow the fusion of system-level DTs
into one connected scenario DT (a connected ecosystem of
individual DTs) create a feasible way to observe these benefits
and access multi-level data for greater process insight and
situational awareness.
2.3 Industrial Safety in Robotic Systems
In domains such as robotic manufacturing or passenger road
vehicles, the certification of safety-critical systems and parts
thereof is regulated by standards, such as ISO/TS 15066 (2016)
and ISO 26262 (2011). These standards make recommendations
about how safety assurance is to be carried through and what is to
be delivered to the relevant certification authorities, typically in
the form of what is called a safety or assurance case.
A safety case delivers a structured and evidence-based
argument for the claim that a system is safe to be operated in
a particular context or in certain use cases (McDermid, 1994). It is
a result of assurance tasks that deal with the creation and
combination of the said evidence. Before a given process can
be commissioned, compliance with the claims must be evidenced
to demonstrate that “due diligence” has been performed.
Digital twins provide a unique opportunity to generate
evidence to support a safety case and the verification of a
systems compliance to the given standards. They create an
interface to a process that allow safety engineers and control
engineers to define testable process constraints and predicates to
validate claims made against the twin’s properties and
assumptions (i.e., geometry, programming, tools and usage
limits).
3 RELATED WORK
Our work builds upon several established concepts within the
digital twin community, and those of automated testing and
industrial automation. While the DT concept has been around
since the early 2000s (Glaessgen and Stargel, 2012), literary
examples of DTs are typically specific in application and
narrow in focus (Damjanovic-Behrendt and Behrendt, 2019;
Agnusdei et al., 2021b).
More recently, increasing interest in DTs and associated
technologies has brought more clarity on the challenges
associated with generalising DT approaches, requirements,
safety and supporting standards on the path to general
purpose solutions (Bolton et al., 2018). Reviews examining the
literary distinctions and terminology for technologies associated
with DTs can be found in Kritzinger et al. (2018), Jones et al.
(2020). Surveys examining these standards and requirements can
be found in Jones et al. (2020), Lu et al. (2020), Agnusdei et al.
(2021b), Hou et al. (2021). Discussions on approaches and cross-
application needs are also found in Mabkhot et al. (2018), Bolton
et al. (2018), Agnusdei et al. (2021a) with varied definition of the
term “digital twin”. This step towards more flexible, general
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purpose DTs will be crucial as we create more automated,
connected and situationally-aware production environments
and increasly transfer domain research and knowledge
(Mabkhot et al., 2018; Damjanovic-Behrendt and Behrendt,
2019; Lu et al., 2020).
In Guo et al. (2019), an entity-modular approach to flexible
digital twin definition is proposed as a mechanism of increasing
factory layout efficiency. Twin’s are encapsulated in discrete
modules, as low fidelity models of their physical counterparts.
A entity interface is presented as a standardisation technique for a
collection of DTs and enabling communication between distinct
models. The approach is shown to increase machine up time and
shop floor mobility by using DTs to inform models of many
factory floor designs simultaneously. The authors employ
application-specific software (Siemens Factory Planner) so the
transferability of the approach is limited. Tao and Zhang (2017)
present the notion of a digital twinned shop floor. Here, several
challenges facing the implementation of DT-based smart
manufacturing are outlined in relation to data management,
service tendering and interfacing with physical systems. In Qi
et al. (2018), DTs are discussed from the perspective of service
brokering with a DT shop floor. XML is proposed as a communal
language describing the capabilities, parameters and service
viability in a generalised service manager.
In Shahsavari et al. (2021), an open-source architecture
“Model Conductor-eXtended” is proposed. A simulated drone
is used to demonstrate communication with the framework via a
unilateral Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)
protocol. The current limitations of their framework indicate
that their models are more appropriately labelled digital shadows
as full bilateral data exchange with a physical twin is not
demonstrated (Kritzinger et al., 2018). Zhou et al. (2020)
present a similar concept of a knowledge-driven digital twin
manufacturing cell which utilises a MQTT broker to enable
bilateral communication between a PT work cell and its
corresponding DT. The need for stable, uniform system
interfaces for communication between the DT and PT is
highlighted, emphasising the challenges resulting from the lack
of synchronisation techniques and “out of step” data. These
challenges are also highlighted in a recent review (Lu et al.,
2020), emphasising the need for standardisation (with respect
to communication mechanisms, model representation and
protocols), based on existing industrial standards where
appropriate.
Masison et al. (2021) present a framework to support
collaboration and distributed modelling of medical processes
using a modular design pattern. The example given centres on
infection modelling in the respiratory system and their results are
compared to a conventional simulation model. While the
approach is demonstrated to be more efficient, scalable and
present a lower skill barrier to users, the authors do not
incorporate feedback from the physical system. The results
presented in these works are indicative of successful
implementation of a distributed digital model, rather than a
digital twin (Kritzinger et al., 2018). In Bohlin et al. (2017) the
authors proposes a generic approach to real-time geometry
assurance in the realisation of their “Smart Assembly 4.0”.
Their framework is demonstrated on a spot welding process
and rendered as a 3D visualisation, with an Apache Kafka
interface under development and proposal to use ROS to
expand the capabilities of the platform.
Many of the challenges toward the development of DTs for
collaborative industrial processes have been discussed
historically, with varying terminology and fidelity. It is clear
there is a need for frameworks that are both able to create
easy access to complex DT definitions and behaviours, and
standardise their application and terminology (by appealing to
modern industry standards/protocols). The literature has shown
that conventional approaches are typically narrow in application.
Frameworks that allow the generalisation of DT concepts using a
versatile, scalable approach would therefore be invaluable moving
forward into industry 4.0 and the future of digital manufacturing.
The versatile modular framework presented in the following
sections provides the necessary infrastructure to facilitate many of
the demands outlined in the literature. Based in Unity®, a
complete environmental package is proposed that enables
reconstruction of complex cyber-physical processes. The
software trivialises the creation of advanced modelling
concepts, DT behaviours and utilities to a “drop in place”
interaction within an attractive 3D world—where the results
are visualised. We examine how users are able deploy new
modules to create custom investigations/control schemes using
a case study involving safety assurance of a collaborative
manufacturing process. Two example modules are described,
deployed and used to evaluate the coverage of the proposed
controller and the resultant safety of the real-world process using
the modular digital twin framework.
4 THE CSI DIGITAL TWIN FRAMEWORK
In this section we present the modular digital-twinning
framework 2 developed as part of the CSI project. The CSI
framework was developed to support our broader objectives of
investigating safety and security assurance within cyber-physical
systems (CPS) and collaborative robot processes. This involved
the development of a tool able to support a wide range of safety
topics, interactions and scenarios so that their safety may be
investigated and evidenced.
The CSI framework, as a result, is a versatile, modular tool that
can be used to assemble safety-critical digital twins with variable
levels of complexity and fidelity. Using the commercial game
engine Unity® as base, it facilitates advanced visuals, basic physics
simulation as well as connections to modern AR/VR peripherals
and utilities (see in Figure 1). Presentation of digital twins as a
collection of modular systems and behaviours allows the user to
represent a variety of processes, safety cases and case-studies
using an architecture that is principally developed and informed
by safety.
2All data, samples and presented data can be found on the CSI project repository:
https://github.com/CSI-Cobot/CSI-artefacts
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4.1 Modular Representation
In the description of arbitrary CPS (i.e., a manufacturing
processes), with an arbitrary number of sensors, manipulators
and operators, we define three initial concepts. 1)
entity—modules with a distinct collection of models, state-
machines and behaviours that emulate or interface with the
capabilities of the physical twin, 2) behaviour—modules
without physical embodiment that may introduce unique
programming, or control or communicate with other entities,
and 3) service—modules without physical embodiment that may
provide interfaces to specialist toolboxes or utilities. As shown in
Figure 2, these concepts are defined as distinct module types
based on their function within the CSI framework.
4.1.1 Entity Module Representation
Individual DTs are presented in the form of entity modules with
behaviours associated with providing a simulated avatar (digital
components) and information sources from the corresponding
real device (physical components). When an entity is not
associated with a physical twin (PT) (no associated hardware
or connection(s)), a conventional simulation interface can be
upheld using the entities standalone digital behaviours. The
aggregation of which is referred to as the entity’s digital
twin (DT).
Digital twins become distinct from convention simulation
tools when real-world systems and data sources are configured
to interact with an entity module. Here, an entity module
represents and unique relationship with a specific device or
hardware system based in the real-world. The behaviours
associated with managing that relationship are attributed to
the entity’s physical behaviours and physical twin (PT). The
nature of the interaction between a DT and its corresponding
PT is dependent on the capabilities of the PT, but may also vary
significantly between use-cases. The DT and PT behaviour
modules collectively define the entity’s behaviour stack; as both
the digital representation of the system (a means to simulate it)
and it’s physical representation (a means to interact with it
physically). This provides a basis to characterise a functional
digital twin, its capabilities as a CPS, and create a means extend
existing definitions with further behaviours, connections and
interfaces.
The CSI framework distributes these entity behaviours in the
form of behaviour modules based on the entity’s high-level
classification (i.e. robot, sensor etc) and concepts of
inheritance3. Each entity is characterised by it’s behavioural
“stack” (see Figure 2), containing the aggregate capabilities
and defaults of broader classifications (i.e. device, human). As
a result, complex system representations can be made available to
the user by default, including I/O control, state-machine
representations, communication and service interfaces, without
the user explicitly implementing them. This default behavioural
stack of any entity module may then be extended to include
additional controllers, analysis tools or behaviour modules.
We define a scenario DT as a unique collection of modules,
their configuration, and relationships with the an external
process. Scenario DTs represent a multi-level interface to the
physical process, in which high-level data (such as performance,
control and state information), and low-level data (component
health signals) may be interrogated. This provides a versatile,
holistic, view of the process, its individual constituent modules
and behaviours that can inform the user on the wider safety
context within their collaborative process.
The versatility of the CSI framework becomes more evident
when the DT behaviour inheritance scheme is combined with the
notion of twin-mode switching. These modes are defined based
on three distinct principles relating to the direction of
information exchanged with the PT (Kritzinger et al., 2018).
The corresponding twin-modes representing these groups are
defined as follows:
•Model—A digital model (DM) has no exchange of state data
with a PT system. This mode provides a minimal
representation of a DT within the framework. This may be
considered akin to classical simulation of the system, with
FIGURE 2 | An overview of the relationships between entity modules, behaviour modules and service modules. Entity modules may invoke service or behaviour
modules as part of their behavioural “stack”. The composition of the stack is an aggregation of custom behaviours and inherited modules from broader entity
classifications.
3This is achieved using Object Orientated Programming (OOP) concepts of
inheritance and polymorphism
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interactions between this entity and other entities defined as
uniquely virtual.
•Shadow—A digital shadow (DS) represents a unilateral
exchange of state data from the PT to the framework. The
entity is presented as a hologram of the PT, and may
considered analogous to some principles of hardware in the
loop (HiL) simulation. This allows the state of the PT to be
observed and displayed within the framework.
•Twin—A full digital twin (DT) captures bilateral state data
exchange with a target PT. Dual representation of the DT and
PT allows the state of both systems to be observed and
visualised simultaneously.
The functionality of any one entity module (or entity DT) is
therefore discerned by the active twin-mode. The notion of twin-
mode switching is a powerful feature of the CSI framework as it
allows the user to fluidly represent DTs, DSs, DMs and their
corresponding configurations as a single entity module, without
modifying the design of the process (Bolton et al., 2018;
Kritzinger et al., 2018).
Consider the example where a new system is to be introduced
into an existing scenario DT that represents the user’s current
process. Their scenario is complex, containing a number of
connected entities in the form of DMs, DTs and DSs and the
user wishes to investigate the safety implications of the new
system ahead of investment. As the system is not available, no
data can be provided to the CSI framework from the PT (as a DS
or DT), and so the system is introduced to the scenario as a DM,
to allow the response of the other modules to be observed safely,
and the precise configuration (positioning, tool usage) analysed
and explored.
Once the revised scenario configuration is demonstrated, the
user invests in the new system and it is installed. Initially, the new
system can be represented as a DS which provides accurate real-
time telemetry of the PT to the entity module. This provides
awareness to neighbouring DTs in the process with increasing
fidelity as more features of the PT come online. As the level of
integration of the new system increases, the relationship between
the PT and the entity module can seamlessly transition to a
complete DT representation. Once the module is in DT mode,
state data from both the DT and the PT can be used to inform
high-level logic and decision making processes about the desired
state of the process. The use of twin-modes creates a “plug and
play” paradigm that allows new process configurations to be
evaluated and compatibility issues to be identified before
investing in a specific hardware platform (Dennis et al., 2014;
Aitken et al., 2014; Ippolito et al., 2005).
4.1.2 Behaviour Module Representation
Behaviours not directly representing a PT system (such as process
controllers, analyses, or AI elements) are represented as
behaviour modules. These modules provide a general purpose
template defining only core communication and environmental
interfaces. While they may exist independently, such modules are
typically added to another standard entity DTmodule to facilitate
more complex individual behaviours as shown in Figure 2. This
may be achieved by implementing additional logic, message
broadcasters or receivers in order to extend the behaviour of
another module.
Industrial process controllers are defined as behaviour modules
within the environment, containing references to their subordinate
modules. Messages originating from one module are received by
entities subscribing to that control signal and enact a response
dictated by the receiving module. Examples of complex controller
integration into the CSI framework can be found in related works
(Gleirscher and Calinescu, 2020; Gleirscher et al., 2021).
4.1.3 Service Module Representation
To support entity and behaviour module definitions, service
modules are employed to allow entities and behaviours to
invoke specialist services and utilities as shown in Figure 2.
The service provided by a service module may be handled by
framework-native functionality, or via an interface to an external
network location, toolbox or Application Programming
Interface (API).
Entity modules interact with service modules through service
managers. These enforce a standardised interface on their service
modules to create a “plug and play” topology and ensure
modularity and compatibility across different configurations. A
hierarchical design pattern is used to enforce further
requirements on more specialised service classifications. This
may include any necessary conversions (i.e mapping between
coordinate frames), or translation protocols for an external tool
(or proprietary language) to integrate it with the communal
environment. Isolating the toolbox-specific logic allows the
toolbox to operate under the principle of functionality as a
service (Bolton et al., 2018) whilst enabling the development of
more advanced service modules in the future (Qi et al., 2018).
The interaction between entity modules and service modules is
necessarily time-variant due to the concept of twin-mode
switching and runtime configuration changes. A modular
service architecture is, however, well suited to diverse
arrangements of entities as a relationship between an entity
and a service may be defined in the behaviour manager and
simply brokered from an available service module. This allows
new service/interface relationships to be created dynamically,
under a distributed topology, as the service provider exists
distinctly from the invoking entity module.
4.1.4 Example: Modelling a Human Operator
Human operator twins can themselves may be represented as
entity modules. Similar to other entity models, a human may be
abstracted into a dual digital/physical component representation.
The digital component is defined by a basic motion/animation
modules to provide parameterisation of the model. This base
model is then coupled with an additional programmable
behaviour module that provides basic movement autonomy
and path-planning. This high-level representation provides a
basic interface for simulating the nominal behaviour of a
human actor in the user’s scenario. It also provides a means to
investigate safety of the operator as the nominal condition evolves
(i.e., observable risks or collisions). Within the CSI framework
human models can dropped into the scenario and parameterised
to begin simulating collaborative processes.
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The physical component of the human-entity module
provides a convenient interface for introducing user telemetry
data into the scenario, informed by wearable devices and sensors
positioned on the real operator (or virtual reality peripherals (see
Section 4.2.4). This would allow the response of an active process
to be observed as a result of a real “human in the loop”
interaction, in a safe and controlled environment, when true
human decision-making would be difficult to simulate.
4.2 Core Systems
The composition of modules is created by the user during the
design of their scenario DT. Themodularity of the environment is
enabled by a versatile core architecture shown in Figure 3.
4.2.1 Communication and Control
Communication between modules inside the CSI framework is
handled through a publish-subscribe messaging pattern4. This
versatile pattern allows the representation of multiple topologies:
one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-one (Aitken et al., 2014).
The modules, as publishers, subscribers or both, do not need to be
concerned with the source or destination of their message and
only define the communication channel they use. System and
environmental events are broadcast similarly, and may be
accessed in the form of messages to subscribing modules. This
provides modules with a source of ground truth data for analysis
(i.e., collisions, damage or connection updates).
Outside-facing data streams, between the framework and
external platforms, are managed by the service modules as
shown in Figures 2, 3. Service modules expose within the CSI
framework an interface defined using the same publication-
subscription abstraction. They thus abstract the specific
database languages (MySQL, SQLite etc.) or network protocol
(TCP, UDP, etc.) from the entity module. A critical aspect of
digital twinning is the communication between the DT and its
target PT. As standard, all network-facing DT entity modules
invoke a network service manager as a fundamental behaviour
facilitating communication with their PT. The network service
manager provides the interface through which the broadcasters
and receivers communicate with an outside network, the
directionality of which is determined by the active twin-mode
(see Section 4.1.1).
The user is then able to connect the array of systems to a
common Local Area Network (LAN) and load their associated
middleware to expose their communication streams. Within the
active CSI framework, the user simply provides the protocol
(TCP, UDP, etc.), connection information (such as the IP and
port) and any necessary credentials to the DT module which
retains this information as a “profile” of its PT’s requirements.
4.2.2 Example Connection With the Robot Operating
System
An example of a network service module developed for the CSI
framework is the ROS service module. This extension module
provides access to the open-source ROS network/protocols and
packages as middleware for a number of commercially available
robotic platforms and sensors. Together with ROS-industrial, this
provides a skeleton infrastructure directly compatible with the
CSI framework.
Modules defining an entity DT are dependant on network
services to communicate with the target PT and so may invoke
this service in accordance with its active twin-mode (see Section
4.1.1). In the event the PT is involved, new network service
relationships are dynamically created. Here, defined channels are
made available to broadcast or subscribe to/from the associated
PT system. This allows the DT entity to be informed by changes
in the PT’s state, such as events or joint-states, by associating a
FIGURE 3 | An overview of the CSI modular digital twin framework, entity (blue), service (green) module libraries, behaviour (grey) modules and their integration with
the core framework (yellow). User configured modules and extensions to the standard environment are shown as dashed.
4The publisher-subscriber convention is analogous to the popular Robotic
Operating System (ROS) by design to improve amenability (Quigley et al., 2009).
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channel with the appropriate ROS topic. The CSI framework
library includes most standard ROS message definitions
(e.g.moveit) and, when communicating with a ROS network,
requires minimal conversion.
Use of ROS as the initial middleware platform for PTs
immediately allows a diverse range of research and industrial
systems to communicate with the environment with only minor
configurational changes. Furthermore, it estblishes the basis for
future service modules such as moveit2 and ROS2 (anticipated to
be distinctly more robust protocols for robot communication).
4.2.3 Workflow
The CSI framework presents two distinct operational modes,
namely; 1) Online—As a live interface for control and safety
monitoring overseeing an active process, or 2) Offline—As a
faithful process test-bed for simulation-based analysis. An
overview of the user’s interaction with the software is
described via the workflow presented in Figure 4.
The user assembles their scenario DT using the configuration
tools and utilities. This may involve importing unique user
module definitions or simply selecting from a library of
existing module definitions. The user configures their modules
with connection information, communication channels and
associates control regimes with subordinate entities to define
their nominal process. Additional modules may be introduced to
expose further data streams for analysis or augmentation. The
module configuration may then be exported using the scenario
builder; the same integrated JSON import/export tool is executed
from within the runtime environment to prepare, or save changes
to, the scenario’s configuration.
In the event the CSI framework is used as a simulation test-
bed, the environment may be operated headless and executed
programmatically as an executable file. In this mode, the scenario
configuration may provided as part of an external process and
imported using the scenario builder as shown in Figure 3. This
provides an interface for augmenting the scenario’s initial
conditions programmatically or specify exit conditions to be
able to facilitate exploratory analyses (see Section 5.4). This
might be in the form of mutation testing or Monte Carlo
Analysis, where the DT’s response to many configuration
changes is observed and analysed.
At runtime, information from the scenario such as events,
collisions and notifications are stored in a database. The user may
choose to see and interact with the scenario through the provided
GUI, shown in Figure 1, or operate in headless mode for optimal
performance. Twins with database behaviours are able to archive
custom data streams for targeted analyses (see Figure 2). This
provides the user with the flexibility to generate a historical record
of their own key performance indicators. At the point of analysis,
the user is presented with a structured data archive, or black-box,
representing the scenario history which may then be interrogated
using external tools.
FIGURE 4 | An overview of the CSI framework workflow. Initially (P1), the user creates their scenario, modules and configures them. In the execution phase (P2), the
scenario is processed and may be interacted with during runtime. During runtime, configured logging behaviours write to the user’s database(s) (i.e., SQLite, MySQL).
This log data is parsed and imported in the Analysis phase (P3). A provided database API provides convenient interface for the users external tools.
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4.2.4 Virtual and Augmented Reality
Being able to interact with the PT for the purpose of manual
operation, inspection, or diagnostics allows the operator to
familiarise themselves with its functionality and problems that
might have occurred. With Unity® 3D at the base of the CSI
framework, detailed robotic processes can be similarly visualised
and expose detailed diagnostic information about the state and
health of entities (PT and DT) simultaneously. Using our
interface for Microsoft’s Mixed Reality Toolkit (and others),
this relationship between the PT, DT and the operator is
further enhanced through the use of Virtual Reality (VR) and
Augmented Reality (AR) (as shown in Figure 3).
AR/VR peripherals and other wearable sensors also provide a
means to inform operator models as digital avatars where, from the
perspective of the operator, demonstration of the dynamic response
of an ecosystem of VR/AR twins provides a distinctly richer and
intuitive experience. Human modelling as entities may be seen in
Section 4.1.4. In the literature, previous DT technologies emphasis
the availability of DT information using primitive tools or command-
line utilities, with only recent works starting to utilise VR/AR
(Karadeniz et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2019). These examples however
are strictly limited to a given use case, with standards and generalised
DT utilities not considered. Creating a standardised interaction with
DTs in VR/AR presents a number of opportunities in the areas of
safety visualisation, operator training and remote operation using the
CSI framework.
5 CASE STUDY—A REAL WORLD
INDUSTRIAL PROCESS
In this section a real-world industrial manufacturing process at a
plant in the United Kingdom is presented as a demonstrative
case-study. The example presents a collaborative robotics
scenario with multiple collaborating DTs hosted by the
modular framework. The modular nature of the framework
allows multiple components to be combined to represent once
holistic scenario. This allows the complexities and associated risks
of a modelled system to be associated with the individual modules
and used to isolate novel safety concerns in new scenarios.
5.1 The Collaborative Welding Cell
The case study we examine involves the exchange of a work-piece
between a human operator and a collaborative robot in order to
complete a spot-welding task. The robot separates the operator
from the hazardous welding machine (seen in Figure 5) with a
shared handover table used to exchange assembled/welded
components between the operator and robot. The robot cell is
open on one side, enabling the operator to enter the cell if
required. A safety LIDAR at the base of the welding machine
and a light barrier at the handover table are used to monitor
incursions and provide safety feedback to the system.
For our DT representation, the process is defined by a set of
physical devices, namely; a robotic manipulator, a smart-spot welder,
safety LIDAR, a light barrier and a human operator. An entity
corresponding to each physical component is selected from the
entity library and placed in the DT scenario. The exact geometry
of the robot cell is measured from the physical cell or from the CAD
model, and transferred to the CSI framework (as seen inFigures 1, 5).
The human operator is introduced as an entity module providing a
parametric autonomous avatar of the collaborating staff member.
The manipulator, smart spot-welder and sensors are physically
connected to a common LAN with known static network addresses.
A machine hosting ROS and the appropriate middleware for each
component is introduced and connected. The network address of the
ROS host is then transferred to the CSI framework in the form of a
new service module targeting its address and protocol in order to
create a data access point as seen in Figure 2. A visualisation of the
DT and the corresponding PT at our United Kingdom partner is
shown in Figure 5.
5.2 Assuring Safety
In this application, safety engineers, control engineers, and
certification authorities are interested in enhancing the safety
FIGURE 5 | A side by side view of the physical (left) and digital (right) twins in an existing real-world industrial welding process.
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org December 2021 | Volume 8 | Article 7580999
Douthwaite et al. Digital Twinning for Collaborative Robotics Safety
of the standalone PT. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the CSI
framework presents two distinct opportunities to investigate
safety assurance; as either an online interface to the physical
system or as offline simulation instance of the real-world
process. In this case-study we demonstrate the CSI
framework using the assembled scenario DT as an offline
process interface to validate an experimental safety controller
ahead of deployment.
The CSI framework allows a holistic consideration of the
scenario, as well as a common communication medium for
the PTs to communicate with their digital counterparts, their
controllers and services, and vice-versa. Presenting the data from
each entity DT in a common digital space presents numerous
opportunities to investigate, assess and enhance the safety of the
presented process. For example, as a result of the CSI framework
integration, the planned trajectory of the robot can be predicted,
tested, validated, and visualised in the digital environment prior
to (and in parallel with) execution in the physical space. The CSI
framework may also be used to interrogate the state of the
scenario and entities at any point during execution, to evaluate
the state of the system and instigate risk mitigations in the
process.
An often followed approach of instigating risk-mitigating
changes to a scenario to prevent unsafe operating conditions is
a safety controller. Using the CSI framework as an offline interface
to the process, the design of such a controller can be evaluated
and iterated.
The claim of the safety case for the robot welding cell is defined
as “operator harm is highly unlikely”. The first part of the
assurance task is to formally verify this claim in a conceptual
model (Gleirscher and Calinescu, 2020). The second part of this
task is the transfer of the verification result in the digital cobot
welding cell, most practically, by validation of the concrete
controller for a main use case by means of simulation-based
testing (Lesage and Alexander, 2021). In the following, we discuss
how the CSI framework can be utilised to carry through such a
validation step. Technical details about the approaches followed
for model verification and simulation-based testing are available
from Gleirscher and Calinescu (2020); Lesage and Alexander
(2021).
5.3 Controller Module Implementation
Gleirscher and Calinescu (2020) propose a tool-supported
method for developing supervisory discrete-event safety
controllers responsible for maintaining safety conditions in
human-robot collaborations. In Gleirscher et al. (2021), a
formal approach to deriving a correct conceptual controller
module is discussed, first independent of a target execution
platform and then in the context of the deployment and
validation of this module on such a platform, the present CSI
framework.
In our example (see Section 5.1), while the robot follows a
programmed workflow, the occurrence of a hazard (e.g., the
operator enters the cell during robot or welder operation)
triggers the safety controller’s intervention. The controller
switches the cell, particularly the robot and the welder, into an
appropriate safety mode (e.g., speed and separation monitoring)
and a safer task (e.g., work piece transfer instead of welding)
based on the current state (including safety mode and task) of the
DT environment. Once the hazard has been cleared (e.g., by
interaction of the controller with the operator and the operator
leaving the cell), the controller resumes the process with a relaxed
safety mode (e.g., normal mode) and the original task, if possible,
such that normal operation can directly continue or resume from
a defined workflow position.
This conceptual controller, based on hazard analysis and risk
assessment, has to be transferred to a concrete executable for
evaluation and eventual deployment on the live cell. In this
article, we demonstrate a deployment of this controller on the
CSI framework in the form of a behaviour module. To accomplish
this task, we need to 1) define the interface between the controller
and the (real or digital) welding cell and 2) generate an executable
controller module.
5.3.1 Defining the Interface Between the Controller
and the Cobot Welding Cell
An interface can be defined both syntactically and
behaviourally (Broy, 2010). Following this paradigm, we
first define the channels through which the controller
monitors and controls (real or digital) properties of the cell
and the data types of these channels (Table 1). The controller
has control over the safety mode of the whole cell (i.e., all
machines in the cell), over the activity of each machine, and
can interact with the operator through notifications.
Furthermore, the controller observes these properties and
has access to the robot location and two sensors; a range
detector and a light barrier.
Second, we define the behaviour of the machines under
hazard-triggered supervisory control. Using state machines,
we define what it means for a welder or robot to change its
safety mode and task on request by the safety controller. That
is, each machine needs to implement a subset of supported
safety modes (e.g., normal and stopped for the welder,
pflim [power and force limiting] and ssmon [speed and
separation monitoring] for the robot) and a subset of tasks
(e.g. idle and welding for the welder, exchange work-piece and
idle for the robot). Three state machines for this behavioural
scheme are exemplified in Figure 6. The dashed state “Core”
in Figure 6C is an abstract state comprising the three modes
normal, pflim, and stopped, meaning that the three transitions
outgoing from “Core” can be triggered from each of the
three modes.
5.3.2 Generating and Connecting the Controller With
Sensors and Actuators
We implement the described interface (Table 1, Figure 6)
using the infrastructure (i.e., entity and service libraries)
provided by the CSI framework. Based on this interface, we
derive the concrete controller from the conceptual controller
module. Automatic controller synthesis, out of scope here, is
done by the YAP tool in the context of probabilistic model
checking and described in more detail in (Gleirscher and
Calinescu, 2020; Gleirscher, 2020). The generated
SafetyController (implemented in C#, Figure 7, Figure 8)
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is imported as a behaviour module and assigned to the robot
entity module. For deployment, the generated controller is
connected via the channels made available by the host CSI
framework. As described in Section 4.2.1, an interface for
communication between modules, presented in the form of
message transport behaviours, allows the controller to
subscribe to state updates (e.g., the location of the robot
arm and end-effector) from the robot DT and event
TABLE 1 | Syntactic interface between the safety controller and the cobot welding cell DTs.
Property Channel datatype Monitored Controlled
Safety mode Mode  {normal, pflim, . . . } C C
Robot location Place  {atTable, inCell, . . . } C
Welder activity Task  {idle, welding, . . . } C C
Robot activity Task  {idle, exchange workpiece, . . . } C C
Range detector Range  {far, near, close} C
Light barrier Boolean C
Notification AlarmSignal  {leave cell, leave workbench, . . . } C
FIGURE 6 | An overview of the state machines defining the behaviour of the welder in the welding cell, highlighting the interactions between the process and safety
layers. An excerpt of the safety controller state machine is included to highlight the control of the safety mode and welder activity. The transitions capture both the
messages sent, and the guard enabling the transition. (A) Welder safety behaviour model. (B) Welder process behaviour model. (C) Except of the safely controller
behaviour model, including abstract state core to highlight controller actions.
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notifications from the sensor DTs (e.g., the state of the light
barrier).
5.4 Deploying a Validation Technique as a
Module
To assess the behaviour of systems modelled in the CSI
framework as scenarios, in particular regarding safety aspects,
we defined and evaluated an analysis technique in related works
(Lesage and Alexander, 2021; Gleirscher et al., 2021). The
technique uses the scenario DT as a proxy of the system PT
during evaluation. The module interacts with the scenario DT to
explore reasonable test cases, varying the runtime configuration
of the system, and process the collected data to ensure the desired
safety conditions hold in the system. Coverage metrics, supported
by the module, provide an assessment of the quality of the
generated test cases.
The validation technique itself is defined as an external tool, a
set of Python utilities addressing various aspects of the interaction
with the CSI framework. External tooling facilitates the use of
offline monitoring techniques for validation, at no runtime cost,
and the integration of the DT with automated test heuristics. As
described in Section 4.2, the CSI framework uses open-standard
formats for configuration and data export, respectively JSON and
SQLite, easing the process of interacting with a scenario DTs from
various languages.
FIGURE 7 | Safety controller module sample code depicting the structure of the safety controller.
FIGURE 8 | Spot welder safety mode transition sample code (Figure 6)
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In our use case, the validation needs to ensure the
synthesised safety controller module, and its integration,
maintain the same safety conditions required to be fulfilled
by the conceptual controller module. The CSI framework
allows the collection of data, in the form of execution
traces, that describe the behaviour of the safety controller
under defined test conditions and model assumptions. This
information is key to evidencing the claim (cf. Section 5.2)
that the welding cell is safe.
5.4.1 Collecting and Validating Scenario Traces
The validation module needs to capture a view of the events that
occur in the scenario DT to assess its behaviour. Such a trace of
events can then be validated against predicates capturing
important functional or safety-related properties, e.g., ensuring
any ongoing weld is interrupted within an acceptable time frame
when the operator enters the cell.
A behaviour module was introduced to the CSI framework as a
message snooper. This allows for the registration of all, or a
selection of, messages exchanged between entities during
execution. The execution procedure of the welder safety and
process controller can be seen in Figure 6A,6B respectively. The
module was configured to capture the messages both to and from
the controller as per Table 1, that is the state of the various
entities, the commands issued by the controller, and the hazards
identified by the controller. The messages collected during
repeated runs of the scenario DT are then processed to build
the trace of events in the system. Simple conversion rules defined
for the case study map the message’s contents onto a number of
time series, based on the message type, incoming channel, and
emission timestamp. As an example, light barrier status messages
result in a time series capturing the sensor’s state over time.
All traces are then checked against a number of validation
rules and any violation is reported for the user to review.
Validation rules, such as safety conditions, are expressed as
metric temporal logic predicates (Basin et al., 2015),
exemplified in Figure 9. Such predicates can assess the
ordering of events in time, ensure specific ones always hold, or
that events occur within specific time windows. For our case
study, all generated traces were validated against the same safety
conditions used for the conceptual controller model. This
validates the synthesised safety controller on the same
properties that ensured the safety of the model.
5.4.2 Automating Testing of the Scenario
The CSI framework supports a scenario configuration JSON, as
part of P1 in Figure 4, that exposes the properties of all entities in
the modelled system. As a runtime configuration file, the scenario
configuration JSON allows for reasonable variations of the same
scenario. The validation module exposes a thin layer to allow
users to specify which configuration points they want to explore
during testing. Given a test vector, a valuation of those
configuration points, the validation module can generate a
runtime configuration file for the CSI framework, instantiate
the scenario DT, and validate the resulting trace.
In our use case, we focus on varying the behaviour of the
operator and the moment he interrupts the work in the cell. The
runtime configuration includes the time spent by the operator at
each waypoint of their trajectory, illustrated in Figure 10. A test
vector is thus defined as 5 wait times to control when the operator
would enter the cell or access the shared bench. Test vectors are
randomly generated with an added constraint that the path
FIGURE 9 | Example of a safety predicate used for verification, expressed as a temporal logic formula. It ensures that if at any time in the events trace hazard HC
occurs in the work cell, as defined by the safety analysis, it is later mitigated by the safety controller. It cannot be ignored, or let to disappear unacknowledged.
FIGURE 10 | System configuration during testing, the time spent by the
operator at each of the labelled waypoint is exposed as a configuration
variable.
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should be completed in 20 s, allowing the cobot to complete its
work even following an interruption.
The validation module relies on situation coverage to assess
the performance of our testing strategy, and determine if
further testing is required (Alexander et al., 2015).
Situation components are defined by the DT events and
their expected values. Situations can be defined from either
individual components or combinations thereof, e.g.
respectively observing the welder in all its activities (see
Figure 8) or by, combining the Range detector and Robot
location properties (see Table 1), ensuring the operator gets
close to the welder while the robot is at the table. The same
event traces used for validation also support the computation
of the coverage achieved by a set of tests. Our coverage
criterion for the controller validation ensured all sensor
states in isolation were covered during testing. We also
enforced that operator interference was observed at all
stages of the process, from the collection of the work-piece
at the shared bench to the welding of the work-piece, at either
the shared handover table or within the cell.
5.5 Evaluation
The validation was performed using the CSI framework as a
simulation-based test-bed. Upon initialisation of the scenario DT,
a JSON configuration file is imported to configure entities and
their behaviour to reflect to the defined test conditions. The
scenario is executed and interactions between the entity modules
are thus observed under variable conditions.
We performed 100 tests for the considered use case, each
running for 30 real-time seconds. The whole test suite took less
than 2 h to complete, including the processing and validation of
generated traces, on an Intel® Core i5-8250U4-core CPU at 1.8
GHz, with 8 GB RAM under the Windows 10 Home Edition
operating system, build 19 042.985. No run was observed that
violated the monitored safety conditions. Full coverage, based on
the discussed situation-based criterion, was achieved. This
ensures all hazard sources have been encountered during
testing, and properly mitigated by the integrated safety
controller module.
6 DISCUSSION
In this article, the CSI framework was introduced as a versatile,
modular tool for assembling safety-critical digital twins and the
wider investigation of safety assurance in collaborative robotic
processes. The framework was designed to support the evaluation
of novel safety-related techniques in a wide range of scenarios,
where humans and robots work together to achieve a
common goal.
The CSI framework provides an environment for developing,
implementing, and testing safety techniques (whether digitally or
physically or both). At the core of the CSI project is the evaluation
of new techniques to understand and mitigate the safety of a
collaborative environment. The modular DT paradigm supports
the collection of evidence for safety assurance tasks on new
scenarios offline and before their deployment, as we
demonstrated with the addition of a novel work-preserving
safety controller in an industrial work-cell. The introduction
of twin-mode switching means that digital and physical
components can coexist in the scenario using variable DM, DS
and DT representations; physical components can be phased into
the scenario progressively, transparently replacing their digital
counterparts, as confidence in the safety of the system grows and
the scenario is moved online. This produces a modular
environment across DM, DS and DT both in hardware and
software.
The modular architecture lays the groundwork for a library of
ready-for-purpose behaviours, services and entity modules.
Modules can be “dropped” into the scenario from this library
to quickly establish a working scenario DT. The samemodularity,
stemming from the framework messaging infrastructure, allows
users to enrich scenarios with their own behaviours and analyses
simply by defining the communication interface. The scenario
constructed in Section 5.2 illustrates how critical process
information can be extracted to support these use cases. This
scenario was built using existing modules for the various
machines and components; the safety controller and validation
modules were the only extensions to the framework, respectively
as a new behaviour module and interfaces for an external
analysis tool.
We have created a scenario DT, based on an industrial case
study, that is sufficiently accurate and provided the required
evidence to demonstrate and validate a synthesised safety
controller with the aforementioned modules. The approach
described here paves the way for further offline safety analysis
of collaborative robot processes, and a stepping-stone to full
validation on physical systems. The CSI framework is agnostic to
virtual or physical applications, and allows the acceleration of
development using virtual resources to perform the significant
safety analysis without requiring the physical resource, a critical
factor in how manufacturing will deal with COVID-19 and its
impact on maintaining existing and developing new processes on
the shop floor. This provides a valuable tool for designers to
prototype and evaluate safety schemes offline, and rapidly
transfer these to physical systems with minimal effort. It also
opens up exciting opportunities for development of digital
techniques for safety assurance in collaborative robotics.
The CSI framework provided a safe environment for the
iterative integration and revision of the synthesised safety
controller, a virtual test-bed for experimentation carrying no
risk for actual operators or physical assets. We used the
opportunity to repeatedly test and refine the system
configuration. Fine control over the scenario helped us identify
and resolve issues during the synthesis of the novel safety
controller and inform its design. We used this opportunity to
further evaluate the system response to misuse cases where two
operators interact with the cell, violating the safety controller’s
design assumptions.
The process captured by the scenario DT presents an
interactive model of the considered welding cell and it allows
the exploration of varied, realistic configurations, all
instrumented to assess the overall safety of the system. It
provides credible evidence on the behaviour of the individual
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components, the consequences of the operator’s actions and
the process as a whole. In Section 5.4, successful test results
did validate the behaviour of the safety controller and, as part
of our safety case (see Section 5.2), they support the claim that
the considered cell is safe under the assumption that a single
operator interacts with the welding cell. The misuse case
evaluation and the related test cases further provide initial
insight on how those assumptions could be leveraged, and
further validated.
As part of the wider safety context, the presented case-study
demonstrates the ability of the CSI framework to provide and
expose critical process information to support multi-level
scenario analyses. In Section 5.4.1, this information is used to
validate the response of a novel safety control to varying
conditions within a virtual cell, but could by employed to new
module configurations to explore new behaviours, potential risks
and scenarios.
The information exposed by CSI framework, and a given
scenario DT, reaches beyond twins of the physical entities or
default entity modules. This is because entity modules are limited
in that they only embody the capabilities of their target PT. The
framework however creates an interface to capture relevant
information, beyond the capabilities of the PT, as a means to
inform the safety of PT or of the process as a whole. This may be
to support analyses with supplementary data sources for
comparison, or ground truth, or even provide a placeholder
for sensing gaps that might exist in the PT. These might take
the form of sensory behaviour modules, that may provide metrics
unavailable in the real-world. An example would be capturing the
distance between the operator and the robot irrespective of the
LIDAR blind spots. Such tools are key to the experimental
validation of safety conditions, generated as part of the system
safety analysis.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a highly modular environment for the
development of safety critical digital-twins for collaborative
robotic processes. We have shown how sophisticated, multi-
level, scenario DTs can be assembled to represent complex,
collaborative environments with variable configurations and
relationships with external hardware. This is achieved using a
framework fundamentally based on modularity, allowing systems
and scenarios to be constructed with ease using a library of
standardised entity, service and behaviour modules. This
modularity has been heavily influenced and informed by our
wider safety research, and by the tools and techniques we are
using to provide safety assurance.
A novel contribution of this work is in the use of modular DTs
for safety research. We have shown how a scenario DT can be
easily created and used to investigate and collect evidence to
support safety claims made against a collaborative robotic
process. This opens up exciting avenues for further research;
beyond the work described in this paper we are using the
framework to train safety sensing and decision-making
systems, monitor for cyber-security intrusions, visualise safety
information, and provide training in robotic safety assurance
techniques.
Whilst COVID-19 restrictions have prevented access to
physical facilities and testing on practical systems, the CSI
framework has enabled us to continue our work and been
shown to be capable of providing evidence to support offline
safety investigations. This has been evidenced in an example case-
study, in which both a novel safety controller and validation
analysis are implemented using the CSI framework. The results
demonstrate that the controller performed safely in 100 scenarios
enacted in the DT, supporting the case for the controller’s
practical deployment.
Although the work described above has been carried out
virtually, the framework is agnostic in its application in
physical or virtual environments; its design allows for physical
entities to be connected and controlled as and when available (as
we have done in other applications). Consequently, the
framework allows for great flexibility in the design, testing,
and deployment of safety techniques and controllers.
To be able to form conclusions about the safety of a
collaborative process, the behaviours and entity (DM) modules
representing real-world entities must be faithful to the real world
PT. The modular design of entities and behaviours will enable
future work to enhance the fidelity of specific systems to be able to
make more informed safety arguments and advanced monitoring
tools. This will be approached by enhancing the CSI framework’s
library of existing modules and tools, or by extending the library
with new module definitions. This may take the form of more
realistic sensor behaviours (and limitations), operator actions or
more sophisticated motion planning tools.
The CSI framework has the capability to produce diverse
ecosystems of modules, processing both low-level and high-
level information across a number of safety scenarios. The
scalability of the CSI framework will be assessed in future
work; to better understand the impacts of many of the real-
world challenges associated with managing and networking
systems of connected modules.
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